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EXTRINSIC-FACT TEST
fare equally throughout the country, and possibly lead to more efficient
administration.3
Although Justice Harlan in Shapiro labeled the majority's holding an
unwise extension of the equal protection clause,4" it seems that if this
trend toward expansion continues, state classifications that deny a right
or privilege to one portion of its citizenry will be subject to closer scru-
tiny than in the past. There is no indication what classification the Court
will next regard as "inherently suspect."
GEORGE HACKNEY EATMAN
Torts-Extrinsic-Fact Test in the Law of Slander
The law of defamation has provoked many caustic comments from
legal writers. Sir Frederick Pollock notes that "no branch of the law
has been more fertile of litigation than this [defamation] ...nor has
any been more perplexed with minute and barren distinctions."1 Dean
Prosser calls defamation "a senseless thing, for which no court and no
writer has had a kind word for upwards of a century and a half. It has
been denounced many times in whatever scathing terms the vivid imagina-
tion of learned and literary authors could invent ...."2
The confusion that tends to invade this area of the law is apparent in
a recent North Carolina Court of Appeals case, Beane v. Weiman Co.3
In an action for slander by a former employee against her former employer,
her former employer's president, and two other company employees, the
plaintiff alleged that a company official had been informed by the two
other employees that plaintiff had called their wives and reported that
they were consorting with other women. The official told plaintiff that
one of the other employees was essential to the company and that he
had no choice but to terminate plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff further
alleged that these words were spoken by the employee-defendants with
" One suggested approach calls for the use of a negative income tax. See
Tobin, Pechman, & Mieszkowski, Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?, 77 YALE
L 1 (1967).
L. 39 4 U.S. at 659 (dissenting opinion).
F. POLLOCx, THE LAw op TORTS 237 (12th ed. 1923).
-'Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. Rnv. 839 (1960). In a lighter vein
A. P. Herbert noted that "the law of libel is almost incomprehensible, except to
those who have studied it from their cradles, and even for them it is a labyrinth
of uncertainties, of false clues, blind alleys, and unexplored passages." A. P. HER-
BERT, UcooxO LAw 129 (1936).
5 N.C. App. 276, 168 S.E.2d 236 (1969).
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malice and for the purpose of harming plaintiff's reputation and employ-
ment, that they had been repeated with malice by the company official
within the scope of his employment, and that the words had caused injury
to the plaintiff in her occupation. A demurrer to the complaint was
sustained by the lower court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals
affirmed.
4
The separate actions for slander and libel have their roots deep in
the common law. An early jurisdictional clash with the ecclesiastical
courts resulted in the development of certain categories of words where
pecuniary loss would be presumed and the common law courts would have
jurisdiction.5 Three categories of slander developed within which the
plaintiff could recover without proof of damage: (1) words imputing a
crime involving moral turpitude; (2) words imputing a loathesome
disease; and (3) words affecting the plaintiff in his business, trade,
profession, or office. In all other cases the plaintiff could not get his case
to the jury without alleging and proving his pecuniary loss.' Incontinency
of an innocent woman has been added by statute as a fourth category
in most jurisdictions. 7 The courts referred to words falling within the
categories as slander per se and those not within the categories as slander
per quod. s
At common law the utterance could be within the categories by its
apparent meaning or only by reason of extrinsic circumstances. The
plaintiff was allowed to plead and prove facts not apparent upon the face
of the publication by way of "inducement." He could then establish the
defamatory sense of the publication with reference to such facts by "in-
nuendo." 9 Such an innuendo was required whenever the plaintiff relied
on extrinsic facts to give the words a defamatory meaning. In such a
case the plaintiff was required to plead the words, the extrinsic facts,
and knowledge of those facts by one or more of those persons to whom
the words were published.' If by this method the plaintiff could estab-
IId. at 276-77, 168 S.E.2d at 236-37.
'W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS 772 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PRossER];
Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 99, 110-12; Veeder, The
History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 CoLum. L. REv. 546, 555-60
(1903).
GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 143 (6th ed. R. McEwen & P. Lewis 1967)
[hereinafter cited as GATLEY]; M. NEwELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL 6-7 (4th ed.
1924) [hereinafter cited as NEwELL] ; PROssER 772-80.
'E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99-4 (1965).
8 Henn, Libel-by-Extrinsic-Fact, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 14, 17-18 (1961).
-GATLEY, supra note 6, at 94-95; PROSSER, supra note 5, at 766.10GATLEY, supra note 6, at 94.
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lish that the words were within any of the categories, the words were
held to be slander per se without the requirement for allegation of special
damages.
The law of libel, however, developed along different lines. The
potential threat of the written word was recognized early by the English
monarchy, and this realization led to the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Star Chamber in certain cases of written defamation. The special cate-
gories that emerged in slander did not develop in libel since the early
emphasis was not on limiting the action but on expanding it as part
of a general censorship program.'- Recovery is still allowed in England
and in a minority of the American jurisdictions for all libel with no
requirement that plaintiff plead and prove damages.' 2 However, the
majority of American jurisdictions have deviated from the common law
rule." The majority allow recovery without proof of special damages
only in those cases in which the defamatory nature of the writing is
apparent on its face or in which the plaintiff can show, by resorting to
extrinsic facts, that the writing falls within the four special slander cate-
gories. In all other cases in which only extrinsic facts show defamation,
the plaintiff must plead and prove special damages.'
"'Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 99, 116-22; Veeder,
The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUm. L. Rlv. 546, 562-71
(1903).
" Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REv. 839, 843 (1960). The Restatement
of Torts states that "[O]ne who falsely, and without a privilege to do so, publishes
matter defamatory to another in such a manner as to make the publication a libel
is liable to the other although no special harm or loss of reputation results there-
from." RESTAIEMENT or Toms § 3-569 (1938).
"
3See, Henn, Libel-by-Extrinsic-Fact, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 14 (1961); Prosser,
Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REv. 839 (1960); Prosser, M~ore Libel Per Quod,
79 HARv. L. Rnv. 1629 (1966). But see Eldredge, Spurious Rule of Libel Per
Quod, 79 H.Av. L. Rav. 733 (1966). For a discussion of this problem in North
Carolina see Note, 33 N.C.L. REv. 674 (1955). The most recent statement of the
North Carolina position is found in Robinson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 273 N.C.
391, 159 S.E.2d 896 (1968).
" Dean Prosser's proposed revisal of the Restatement of Torts would read as
follows:
§ 569. Liability Without Proof of Special Harm.
(1) One who publishes defamatory matter is subject to liability without
proof of special harm or loss of reputation if the defamation is
(a) Libel whose defamatory meaning is apparent from the publication itself
without reference to extrinsic facts, or
(b) Libel or slander which imputes to another
(i) A criminal offense, . . .
(ii) A loathesome disease, ...
(iii) Matter incompatible with his business, trade, profession or office,...
(iv) Unchastity on the part of a women .....
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The extrinsic-fact test, which determines if the plaintiff must plead
and prove special damages, evolved solely in the law of libel. The two
categories of libel were labelled per se and per quod.15 Libel per se
required no special damages; libel per quod did. But the double meaning
of these two terms created a situation ripe with possibilities for con-
fusion by the courts.
The categories of words held to be slander per se have long been
recognized in North Carolina." The court in Beane quoted with approval
from Penner v. Elliott,l' an earlier North Carolina slander case in which
the North Carolina Supreme Court said that "[w]e must look to the
common law, under the guidance of our own decided cases ..."s and
the words held to be slander per se included "[a] ccusations of crime or
offenses involving moral turpitude, defamatory statements about a person
with respect to his trade, occupation or business, imputations of having
a loathesome disease, and the like."' 19
The confusion arises in the law of slander in North Carolina when
the plaintiff must resort to extrinsic facts to show the defamatory mean-
ing of the utterance. There is authority for the proposition that North
Carolina adheres to the common law rule allowing the plaintiff to resort
to extrinsic evidence to bring the utterance into one of the slander per
se categories without his having to show special damages. The common
law rule was stated in an early case, Watts v. Greenlee,20 in which the
court, considering a charge of incontinency, ' 21. said that "[w] ords not in
themselves actionable may be rendered so . . . by something extrinsic,
with the aid of innuendo."22
In certain cases the plaintiff may be forced to rely on extrinsic facts
such as an unusual meaning of the utterance or facts known to the hearer
to prove defamation. If the defamatory meaning thus alleged is subject
(2) One who publishes any other libel or slander is subject to liability only
upon proof of special harm ....
Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. Rnv. 839, 850 (1960).
" E.g., Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 785, 195 S.E. 55, 59
(1938); see Henn, supra note 8, at 22.
1 E.g., Broadway v. Cope, 208 N.C. 85, 179 S.E. 452 (1935) (injury to trade);
Oates v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 205 N.C. 14, 169 S.E. 869 (1933) (crime
involving moral turpitude); McKee v. Wilson, 87 N.C. 300 (1882) (crime and
use of office).
225 N.C. 33, 33 S.E.2d 124 (1945).I81d. at 34, 33 S.E.2d at 125.10/d.
2013 N.C. 115 (1829).
21Id. at 118-19.
"
2id. at 117.
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to permissible inference, the case is for the jury. For example, the plain-
tiff resorted to extrinsic facts in Oates v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.,2"
a case involving an accusation of crime. The court allowed the introduc-
tion of the "circumstances of the publication" and "the hearer's knowledge
of facts which would influence their understanding of the words used '24
without requiring an allegation of special damages.
Scott v. Harrison25 contains another exposition of the majority posi-
tion with respect to extrinsic evidence in the law of slander. The plain-
tiff, a high school principal's wife, alleged that defendant had said that
the plaintiff had been forbidden to go on the premises of a school at
which her husband had been principal. 6 Justice Seawell in a well-
reasoned opinion criticized the arbitrary categories of slander, but re-
affirmed the position of the categories in North Carolina law.' In ap-
proaching the problem of extrinsic evidence, he said that "[iln the com-
plaint under consideration none of the charges of slander is laid with an
'innuendo' attaching any special meaning to the words used other than
that which is obvious, and under the ordinary meaning they are not action-
able per se."'2 1 Clearly, "innuendo" would have been allowed to bring
the words within the common law slander categories.
A hint of confusion and deviation from the common law is contained
in the early case Pegram v. Stoltz.29 In an action for slander, the plain-
tiff alleged that the defendant called him "a perjured man" for falsely
swearing as to his residence before a board of registrarsY0 The court first
concluded that the crime alleged was not infamous; thus the accusation
was not within that category of slander.3" The court, discussing the in-
troduction of extrinsic evidence, stated that
[W]hen the words spoken are such as do not on their face import
such degradation as will of course be injurious . . . then the plaintiff
must aver some special damage, which is called laying his action with
a per quod, and must show by proof that he has in point of fact
sustained a loss before he can recover 3 s
28 205 N.C. 14, 169 S.E. 869 (1933).
'Id. at 17, 169 S.E. at 871.2 215 N.C. 427, 2 S.E.2d 1 (1939).
Id. at 428-29, 2 S.E.2d at 1-2.
Id. at 430, 2 S.E.2d at 2.
Id. at 430, 2 S.E.2d at 2.
"76 N.C. 349 (1877).
:o Id. at 349-50.
"Id. at 352.
"Id. at 351.
19701
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
This statement can be regarded as surplusage in the decision of the case
since extrinsic circumstances could not have brought the accusation within
any of the slander per se categories. The implication is present, however,
that extrinsic circumstances would not have been allowed to prove the
words actionable per se.
The North Carolina Supreme Court continued its deviation from the
common law in Deese v. Collins,2 in which the allegation was that the
defendant had charged the plaintiff, a white man, with having Negro
blood."4 The court relied on the common law slander categories to hold
that the allegation was not slander per se."5 The court also implied that
extrinsic evidence would not have been allowed to bring the utterance
within the slander categories by quoting with approval8" from Pegram, but
again this part of the opinion can be considered dictum since extrinsic
evidence would not have aided the plaintiff. In Badame v. Lampke,8' cited
by the court of appeals in Beane, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
confirmed its confusion of the common law of defamation. The words
complained of in this case were directed toward a businessman and clearly
fell within one common law category of slander per se.28 Relying on Deese
v. Collins,9 the court expressly imported the extrinsic-fact test, a libel
distinction, into the law of slander by stating
[I]f the injurious character of the spoken statement appears, not on its
face as a matter of general acceptance, but only in consequence of
extrinsic, explanatory facts showing its injurious effect, such utterance
is said to be actionable only per quod, and in such cases, the injurious
character of the words must be pleaded and proved, and in order to
recover there must be allegation and proof of some special damage.40
The court concluded in this case that the defamation was apparent on its
face. 41
In Beane the court relied both on Penner v. Elliott,42 which is authority
for application of the traditional common law slander test, and on Badame
191 N.C. 749, 133 S.E. 92 (1926).
S4 Id. at 749, 133 S.E. at 92.
Id. at 751, 133 S.E. at 92-93.36Id. at 750, 133 S.E. at 92.8'242 N.C. 755, 89 S.E.2d 466 (1955).88Id. at 757, 89 S.E.2d at 468.
'8191 N.C. 749, 133 S.E. 92 (1926).
,0 242 N.C. at 757, 89 S.E.2d at 467-68.
'
1 Id. at 757, 89 S.E.2d at 468.
40225 N.C. 33, 33 S.E.2d 124 (1945).
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v. Lampke, 8 which requires use of the extrinsic-fact test. The court could
have decided that the words did not fall within the category of injury
to trade and employment and thus might have relied solely on the tradi-
tional slander test of Penner in its resolution of the case on the facts before
it. It is impossible to determine if the court actually intended to give
effect to the extrinsic-fact test in concluding that the words were actionable
per quod. The vagueness surrounding the court's holding serves only
to amplify the confusion that exists in the law of defamation in North
Carolina.
The apparent application in Beane of both the traditional slander test
and the extrinsic-fact test has definite implications for plaintiffs in future
slander cases. If both tests are to be applied in North Carolina to deter-
mine what will be slander per se, future plaintiffs will have to allege and
be able to prove special damages in all cases in which the utterance does
not on its face fall within the four slander categories. These requirements
present a formidable hurdle for plaintiffs in cases in which proof of special
damages is difficult.
The most plausible explanation for use of the extrinsic-fact test in
libel is that a limited number of people will understand the defamatory
nature of the writing if it is not apparent on the face. This same con-
sideration should apply to the law of slander, and thus the North Caro-
lina courts are serving a useful function in the area of defamation if they
are attempting to require special damages to make actionable oral state-
ments that on their face do not fall within one of the four traditional
categories.44 The possibility of abuse has always existed in cases in
which the words were held to be slander per se since the jury had dis-
cretion to award damages without evidence of the plaintiff's actual loss.
As a measure to prevent petty suits and as an aid in first amendment
protection, the application of the extrinsic-fact test to supplement the
traditional category test will be valuable in the law of slander.
The confusion of the North Carolina courts over the extrinsic-fact
test arises not so much from the importation of this test from the law of
libel into that of slander as it does from the inconsistent application of
48242 N.C. 755, 89 S.E.2d 466 (1955).
"The application of the extrinsic-fact test in North Carolina slander cases has
been more restrictive than the application of the same test in libel actions in a
majority of American jurisdictions. In libel, the majority allow the introduction
of extrinsic facts to bring the writing within the traditional slander categories with-
out requiring proof of special damages. Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L.
Rav. 839, 850 (1960).
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the test in slander cases. In addition, there appears to be confusion over
whether the extrinsic-fact test was a determining factor in those cases in
which it was stated as the applicable law. These areas of confusion should
be clarified in the next appropriate case to insure that plaintiffs are able
to foresee recovery with some reasonable degree of certainty and to make
clear whether the extrinsic-fact test will always be applied when oral
statements are not actionable on their face.
LANNY B. BRIDGERS
Torts-Liability of Physicians for Violation of Certification
Requirements in Commitment Process
The right of a mentally ill woman not to be restrained against her will
was the concern of the court in Di Giovanni v. Pessel.1 In affirming an
award of punitive damages against a physician whose false affidavit was
a substantial factor in the commitment of the plaintiff to a mental hos-
pital, the court aptly reflected intolerance toward the wilful and injurious
dereliction of a statutorily imposed duty. Unfortunately, convoluted
reasoning obscured the expression of this judicial intolerance.
The civil rights of the mentally ill have received close scrutiny in recent
years,2 and legislation has reflected concern for those rights." Generally,
statutes authorizing involuntary commitment require a judicial hearing
before commitment can be effected; commonly, these statutes require
medical certification as to the insanity of the individual involved before
commitment can be ordered. In case of an emergency whereby the indi-
vidual must be restrained immediately and there is insufficient time for
104 N.J. Super. 550, 250 A.2d 756 (Super. Ct., App. Div. 1969).
2 See, e.g., R. FARMER, THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1967); F. LIND-
MAN & D. MCINTYRE, JR., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (1961)
[hereinafter cited as LINDMAN & McINTYRE]; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL
HEALTH, FEDERAL SEcuRiTY AGENCY, A DRAFT ACT GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION
OF THE MENTALLY ILL (Public Health Service Pub. No. 51, 1952); R. Rocic,
M. JACOBSEN, & R. JANOPAUL, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY
ILL (1968) [hereinafter cited as RocK]; Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the
Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I (1961); Curran, Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill, 31 N.C.L. REv. 274 (1953) ; Comment, The New Mental Health Codes:
Safeguards in Compulsory Commitnent and Release, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 977 (1967).
'See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§21-501 to -591 (1967). In its report to the
Senate when the bill was under consideration, the Senate Judiciary Committee ex-
pressed the hope that the act would serve as a model for revision of state hos-
pitalization laws. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PROTECTING THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL, S. REP. No. 925, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1964).
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